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Abstract
Domestic courts play an important role in the regulation of transnational economic activity,
which I refer to as “transnational judicial governance.” However, because judicial politics
scholars have focused primarily on matters of domestic policy and international relations
scholars have virtually ignored domestic legal institutions, we have very little knowledge about
how domestic courts behave as global governors and why. In particular, are the determinants of
domestic court decisionmaking in transnational judicial governance primarily political, as
leading theories of judicial decisionmaking and international relations would suggest? Or, given
the distinct nature of domestic courts as legal institutions, is transnational judicial governance
instead based on the rule of law? To answer this question, this paper focuses on one important
example of transnational judicial governance decisionmaking: the choice between the assertion
of domestic adjudicative authority and deference to foreign adjudicative authority over
transnational activity based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Drawing on theories of
judicial decisionmaking, international relations, private international law, and bounded
rationality, and using statistical and qualitative analysis of an original dataset of over 200 forum
non conveniens decisions in U.S. district courts, I test a series of hypotheses about the political
and rule-of-law factors that determine the choice between domestic and foreign adjudicative
authority. I find that rule-of-law factors predominate. Although U.S. district court judges are
more likely to defer to foreign governance authority if the foreign state is a liberal democracy,
Republican judges are no less likely than Democratic judges to defer to foreign governance
authority; and the most important factor appears to be the use of a particular decisionmaking
shortcut or “heuristic” that allows judges to make legally competent choices between domestic
and foreign authority while conserving scarce decisionmaking resources.
For helpful comments and criticisms on earlier versions of this paper and the broader project of
which this paper is a part, I thank Mark Axelrod, Paul Schiff Berman, Peggy McGuinness, Tim
Büthe, Matthew Fehrs, Mitu Gulati, Bruce Jentleson, Judith Kelley, Ralf Michaels, Imke RisoppNickelson, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Camber Warren, and David Zaring.
Comments welcome.
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Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance:
The Case of Forum Non Conveniens
1.

Introduction

How do states regulate transnational economic activity? International relations and
international legal scholars have emphasized the role of international institutions as tools of
global governance, giving rise to a rich literature on the origins and consequences of
international organizations and international rules. 1 However, this preoccupation with
international institutions obscures the fact that domestic institutions also play a central role in
state regulation of transnational activity. For example, states often address transnational
problems through transgovernmental networks, which involve direct cross-border interactions
among national regulatory agencies (Keohane and Nye 1974; Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2004;
Slaughter and Zaring 2006; Whytock 2005). In addition, international political economists have
shown that domestic executive and legislative institutions are key players in “two-level games,”
according to which solutions to international cooperation problems must be negotiated not only
among states, but also among domestic political actors within each state (Evans, Jacobson, and
Putnam 1993; Frieden and Martin 2002, 120-126; Putnam 1988).
This paper focuses on the regulation of transnational activity by domestic courts, which I
call “transnational judicial governance” (Whytock 2006b). Thousands of disputes arising out of
transnational economic activity are heard each year in U.S. federal courts alone. Substantively,
these decisions allocate economic resources among transnational actors. Jurisdictionally, they
allocate governance authority among states—for example, by determining whether a domestic
court or a foreign court should adjudicate a dispute, whether domestic or foreign law should be
applied to govern the underlying transnational activity, and whether the decisions of foreign
courts in transnational disputes should be given domestic effect. Moreover, when domestic
courts publish their decisions in transnational litigation, they not only directly affect the litigants;
they also provide information about how they are likely to decide similar cases in the future—
information that can indirectly influence the strategic behavior of transnational actors beyond a
particular dispute. Domestic courts are, in effect, global governors.
Because transnational judicial governance involves the allocation of resources and
authority, its consequences are intrinsically political. But do domestic courts make these
allocative decisions in the same way as other global governors? Leading theories of judicial
decisionmaking and international relations suggest that courts, like other political actors, base
their decisions primarily on political considerations such as ideology and power. These theories
imply that the determinants as well as the consequences of transnational judicial governance are
political. Alternative theories of judicial decisionmaking emphasize the distinctive nature of
courts as legal institutions. These theories imply that transnational judicial governance is based
on the rule of law more than politics. The normative implications of these two visions of
1

For overviews of this expansive body of literature, see Martin and Simmons (1998) and Keohane and Martin
(2003). Recent contributions by international relations scholars include Gruber (2000), Ikenberry (2001),
Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001), Simmons (2000), Simmons and Hopkins (2005) and Von Stein (2005).
Recent contributions by international legal scholars include Norman and Trachtman (2005), Goldsmith and Posner
(2005) and Raustiala (2005).
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transnational judicial governance may be self-evident. But empirical research on the role of
domestic courts in global governance is almost entirely lacking. International relations scholars
have virtually ignored domestic courts, 2 judicial politics scholars have focused primarily on
matters of domestic policy, 3 and legal scholars have engaged in little positive theoretical and
empirical work on transnational litigation. 4 As a result, we have very little knowledge about how
domestic courts behave as global governors and why. In particular, we are left with an open
question: Does politics or the rule of law predominate in transnational judicial governance?
This paper attempts to shed some empirical light on this question, and it does so in an
interdisciplinary manner, using theories of judicial politics, international relations, private
international law, and bounded rationality. Part 2 lays the conceptual foundations, explaining the
role of domestic courts in the regulation of transnational activity and highlighting an important
dimension of variation in transnational judicial governance decisionmaking: assertion of
domestic governance authority versus deference to foreign governance authority over
transnational activity. Part 3 introduces the theoretical priors that inform the political and ruleof-law visions of transnational judicial governance, deriving from them hypotheses about factors
affecting the probability that a domestic court will defer to foreign governance authority instead
of asserting domestic governance authority in a given case. Part 4 describes the data and
methods used to test these hypotheses, which include statistical and qualitative analysis of an
original dataset of over 200 U.S. district court decisions on motions to dismiss transnational
litigation under the forum non conveniens doctrine—decisions in which courts explicitly choose
between domestic and foreign authority to adjudicate transnational disputes. Part 5 presents my
results, and Part 6 discusses the broader implications of my findings.

2.

The Concept of Transnational Judicial Governance

Transnational judicial governance is the regulation of transnational activity by domestic
courts. The principal mechanism of transnational judicial governance is transnational litigation,
by which I mean litigation in domestic courts arising from activity with territorial or legal
connections to more than one state. 5 Between 1995 and 2005, an average of 3,285 cases per year
based on diversity jurisdiction and involving at least one foreign party were terminated in U.S.
district courts alone. 6 The subject matter of these disputes is as diverse as transnational activity
2

Exceptions include Burley (1992), Putnam (2006), Raustiala (2006), Slaughter (1994, 2004, chap. 2), and Whytock
(2006a, 2006b, 2006c). In addition, some international relations scholars have highlighted the role of domestic
courts in European integration, including Alter (2001), Burley and Mattli (1993), and Stone Sweet and Brunell
(1998),
3
Exceptions include studies on U.S. federal court decisionmaking in matters involving human rights (Davis 2006)
and international trade (Unah 1998).
4
Exceptions include Clermont and Eisenberg’s (1996) study of foreign parties in U.S. courts.
5
Hannah Buxbaum (2006) and Robert Wai (2002, 2005a, 2005b) are among those who have most thoroughly
explored the global governance implications of transnational litigation. Slaughter (1994, 2004, chap. 2) describes
cross-border interactions among judges through transgovernmental networks, which might be understood as another
mechanism of transnational judicial governance. However, the most common forms of transnational judicial
governance occur outside the context of such networks. Although important—and perhaps of growing
importance—I do not include in my definition private forms of transnational dispute resolution, such as arbitration
(Dezalay and Garth 1996; Mattli 2001; Stipanowich 2004; Stone Sweet 2006).
6
This is based on my analysis of data obtained from the Federal Judicial Center. Diversity of citizenship of the
parties is only one basis for U.S. federal court jurisdiction over transnational disputes. This figure excludes
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itself, ranging from international business to cross-border environmental damage, from economic
regulation to human rights, and from intellectual property to international terrorism. Although
most of these disputes are between nonstate actors, state actors are frequently involved. For
example, between 1995 and 2005, an average of 475 diversity cases per year in U.S. district
courts involved a foreign sovereign. 7

2.1

The Allocative Functions of Transnational Judicial Governance

At the core of transnational judicial governance are two allocative functions.
Substantively, most transnational litigation involves matters of domestic private law, including
the law of property, contracts, and torts. These fields of private law are policy instruments by
which states authoritatively allocate economic resources (Cooter and Ulen 2000; Kaplow and
Shavell 1999; Shapiro 1972), and in transnational litigation they serve both distributive and
regulatory functions (Wai 2005b, 247-249). Disputes over property rights—including
intellectual property rights—explicitly involve conflicting claims over economic resources. In
such disputes, domestic courts allocate those resources by assigning property rights to one party
or another. Transnational actors enter contracts to reduce their uncertainty about how they will
share the costs and benefits of their economic transactions. In contract disputes, domestic courts
allocate these costs and benefits by determining how the contract is interpreted and whether it is
enforced. Transnational economic activity may generate externalities; that is, it may have effects
on an actor who does not have a contractual relationship with the person engaged in that activity.
In tort disputes, domestic courts allocate the costs of negative externalities among transnational
actors by determining the extent to which the party generating the externalities must compensate
the party that bears the associated costs. In these ways, when domestic courts apply private law
to resolve transnational disputes, they allocate economic resources among transnational actors.
The second allocative function of transnational judicial governance—the allocation of
governance authority among states—arises from the distinct nature of transnational activity.
Because such activity has connections to more than one state, more than one state may have a
basis for legitimately exercising the authority to govern it. The challenge is that “law has
become the prerogative of territorial sovereigns, whereas human affairs freely cross . . . national
boundaries” (Juenger 2005, 3). Three basic types of governance authority are at stake:
adjudicative authority, which is the authority of a state to use its courts to resolve disputes
involving particular actors or things; prescriptive authority, which is the authority of a state to
apply its law to particular actors or activities; and enforcement authority, which is the authority
of a state to induce or compel compliance with its law (Carter and Trimble 1991, 699-702).
In transnational litigation, domestic courts are routinely called upon to decide how to
allocate these three types of authority, and these decisions share a common domestic-foreign
dimension of variation: each decision is either an assertion of domestic authority to govern the
underlying transnational activity, or deference to a foreign state’s authority to govern that
transnational disputes (a) that are brought in federal courts based on jurisdictional grounds other than diversity (e.g.
federal question jurisdiction), (b) that do not involve a non-U.S. party, (c) that are brought in U.S. state courts or (d)
that are brought in non-U.S. courts. Therefore, this figure only offers an estimate of the minimum number of
transnational disputes in domestic courts each year.
7
My analysis of Federal Judicial Center data.
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activity. 8 For example, imagine a dispute arising out of activity with connections to both State A
and State B. If the plaintiff brings the dispute before a State A court, should the State A court
adjudicate the dispute (assertion of domestic adjudicative authority) or should it dismiss the case
so it can be adjudicated by a State B court (deference to foreign adjudicative authority)? If a
State A court decides to adjudicate the dispute, should it apply State A law to the underlying
transnational activity (assertion of domestic prescriptive authority) or should it apply State B law
(deference to foreign prescriptive authority)? And if a State B court adjudicates the dispute, one
party may ask a State A court to enforce the State B court’s judgment against the other party in
State A. Should the State A court refuse to do so (thus asserting the territorial exclusivity of
domestic enforcement authority) or should it give domestic effect to the foreign judgment (thus
deferring to foreign enforcement authority)?
International legal scholars commonly use the term “allocation” to refer to the
distribution of adjudicative, prescriptive and enforcement authority among states (Carter and
Trimble 1991, 699-700; Reisman, Arsanjani, Wiessner, and Westerman 2004, 1381-1383;
Sweeney, Oliver, and Leech 1988, 82-83). However, given the highly decentralized nature of
transnational judicial governance, it must be understood that individual domestic courts cannot
unilaterally allocate that authority. Even if a State A court asserts its own governance authority
over a particular transnational activity, it cannot prevent State B from also asserting authority
over that activity; as Scoles, Hay, Borchers and Symeonides (2004, 2) point out, there is not “an
impartial mechanism of hierarchically superior authority for resolving such conflicts.”
Conversely, even if State A defers to State B’s governance authority, it cannot compel State B to
exercise that authority. How authority actually is allocated ultimately is the aggregate result of
decisions by courts of multiple states. Thus, authority allocation generally should be understood
as a collective function, although not necessarily a coordinated function, of transnational judicial
governance.
The essential point is that, by deciding between the assertion of domestic governance
authority and deference to foreign governance authority over transnational activity, domestic
courts help define the domestic reach of foreign authority and the foreign reach of domestic
authority. Or, to use Krasner’s (1999, 22) terminology, they help define the circumstances in
which Westphalian sovereignty is compromised “through invitation.” 9 As Reisman et al. (2004,
1381) put it, lawyers may “refer to these encounters as ‘conflicts of laws,’ but they are, in the
8

To clarify, by “deference” I mean, at a minimum, a decision by a State A court not to assert State A’s governance
authority, coupled with an affirmation that, under the circumstances, it is appropriate for State B to exercise its
authority. Thus, deference implies an understanding by State A that authority should be allocated to State B. The
term does not, however, imply that State B is necessarily interested in exercising that authority. For example, a
State A court may defer to State B’s adjudicative authority by declining to exercise its own adjudicative authority
over a lawsuit originally brought in the State A court and dismissing it in favor of a State B court; but State B may
or may not actually exercise its authority. On the other hand, declining to assert domestic authority without a
corresponding affirmation of a foreign state’s authority is mere abstention, not deference, and does not imply an
understanding of the appropriate allocation of governance authority. Deference also may be more active. For
example, a State A court may defer to State B’s prescriptive authority by applying State B’s law to transnational
activity, and a State A court may defer to State B’s enforcement authority by ordering the enforcement within State
A territory of a judgment of a State B court.
9
According to Krasner, the institution of Westphalian sovereignty is based on territoriality and the exclusion of
external authority (1999, 20). The invitation of foreign authority does not violate international legal sovereignty
because it is voluntary, but it does violate Westphalian sovereignty (1999, 22).
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most profound sense, conflicts of power, for they engage the very essence of state sovereignty: a
state’s exercise of its political power by making and applying its law.”

2.2

Direct and Indirect Effects of Transnational Judicial Governance

Transnational judicial governance has direct and indirect implications for transnational
activity. For the parties to a particular transnational dispute, the allocative consequences of a
domestic court’s decision are direct. These direct effects are the focus of litigant-oriented
approaches to the study of litigation. Without discounting the importance of litigation outcomes
for individual litigants, the concept of transnational judicial governance is intended to draw
attention to the broader indirect consequences of judicial decisionmaking in transnational
litigation. The behavior of transnational actors depends not only on their preferences, but also on
their beliefs about what other actors will do (Lake and Powell 1999, 8-11), including
governmental actors such as courts. As Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998, 64) explain, “When a
judge decides, the lawmaking effect of the decision is always twofold. First, in settling the
dispute at hand, the judge produces a legal act that is particular (it binds the two disputants) and
retrospective (it resolves an existing dispute). Second, in justifying the decision, the judge
signals that she will settle similar cases similarly in the future; this legal act is a general and
prospective one (it affects future and potential contractants).” 10 In other words, when a domestic
court publishes decisions that allocate economic resources or governance authority in a particular
dispute, it shapes the expectations that transnational actors have about how it will decide similar
allocative issues under similar circumstances in the future, thus influencing their strategic
behavior.
That the impact of substantive court decisions in particular disputes can extend well
beyond the parties to those disputes is well understood—this is the phenomenon of strategic
behavior “in the shadow of the law” (Busch and Reinhardt 2000; Cooter, Marks & Mnookin
1982; Cooter and Ulen 2000). The same is true for decisions that allocate governance authority.
For example, because transnational activity has connections to more than one state, actors may
be uncertain about which state’s laws are applicable to their cross-border activities. When
domestic courts make decisions allocating prescriptive authority in a particular case, they
provide information about applicable law that makes it more likely that transnational actors will
conform their conduct to the law of one state or another. Similarly, jurisdictional decisions
provide information that influences “forum shopping” by transnational actors. When deciding
where to file their lawsuits, plaintiffs consider, among other things, which state’s laws are most
favorable to their claim. For example, if the plaintiff is more likely to win under State A’s law
than under State B’s law, the plaintiff may file its lawsuit in a State A court, even if the
transnational activity giving rise to the dispute occurred primarily in State B. Prior State A court
decisions in similar circumstances applying the law of the place of the underlying transnational
activity rather than its own law would discourage this form of forum shopping, as would State A

10

As Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (2004, 245) explain, “a norm can prevent disputes from arising in the first place,
by providing individuals with behavioral guidance, and by structuring choices concerning compliance. . . . [O]nce a
dispute has erupted, norms may provide the contracting parties with the materials for settling the dispute on their
own, dyadically as it were, to the extent that norms furnish the bases for evaluating both the disputed behavior and
potential solutions to the conflict.”
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court decisions dismissing similar cases that arise from activity occurring outside State A
territory. 11
More generally, transnational judicial governance indirectly affects transnational activity
by either facilitating or hindering alternative approaches to global governance. For example, by
applying international law to transnational disputes, domestic courts enhance the effectiveness of
formal interstate governance arrangements; by declining to do so, they limit the effectiveness of
these arrangements. Similarly, domestic courts can support private governance by enforcing
contracts. Transnational activity generates transnational conflict which in turn creates a demand
for transnational third-party dispute resolution (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, 63-64). Without
third-party dispute resolution, “the costs of exchanges may be prohibitive, since each prospective
party may doubt that the other will abide by promises made over the life of a contract” (Stone
Sweet and Brunell 1998, 64). By providing transnational dispute resolution services, domestic
courts help meet this demand, providing an important global public good that enhances
contracting as a form of private governance. Similarly, domestic courts can support arbitration
as a form of private dispute resolution by enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral
decisions—or they can undermine it by declining to do so. As Slaughter (1995, 519) puts it, “the
availability of judicial enforcement—the coercive apparatus of the State—undergirds the entire
system of international commercial arbitration.”

3.

Transnational Judicial Governance: Politics or Rule of Law?

The concept of transnational judicial governance draws attention to the role of domestic
courts in allocating governance authority among states. But under what circumstances do
domestic courts defer to foreign authority to govern transnational activity instead of asserting
domestic governance authority? What, in other words, explains the domestic-foreign dimension
of variation in transnational judicial governance? Because they allocate authority, the
implications of these decisions are intrinsically political. But are the determinants of these
decisions also political? Or, because judges are the decisionmakers, are these decision instead
based on legal considerations? As Robert Wai (2005b, 251) asks in his insightful discussion of
the global governance implications of transnational litigation, “Do the distinctive politics of
adjudication . . . translate into the possibility that adjudication of transnational disputes by
national courts might follow a different logic than the dominant logic of world politics . . . ?” I
pose this as a question about international relations—namely, about how governance authority is
allocated among states. However, because domestic court judges are the decisionmakers in
transnational judicial governance, I treat the judge rather than the unitary state as the primary
unit of my analysis. And because it is the behavior of judges that I am trying to explain, I reach
outside traditional international relations theory and take the political science literature on
judicial decisionmaking as my theoretical starting point. 12

11

For discussions of how rules allocating adjudicative and prescriptive authority can affect strategic behavior, see
Brilmayer (1991, 167-175), O’Hara and Ribstein (1999, 634-635), and Whincop and Keyes (26-30).
12
This follows Milner’s (1998) call for international relations scholars to relax the unitary state assumption in their
work. So far, however, this rarely has been done to focus on the role of domestic courts in international relations
(for exceptions, see Putnam (2006) and Whytock (2006a, 2006b, 2006c)).
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3.1

Politics in Transnational Judicial Governance

The leading theories of judicial decisionmaking would suggest that domestic court
decisionmaking in transnational judicial governance is driven above all by political factors.
According to the attitudinal model, court decisions are based on judges’ personal policy
preferences (Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Spaeth 1995; Segal and Spaeth 2002). The attitudinal
model assumes that “the primary goals of Supreme Court justices in the decision-making process
are policy goals. Each member of the Court has preferences concerning the policy questions
faced by the Court, and when the justices make decisions they want the outcomes to approximate
as nearly as possible those policy preferences” (Rohde and Spaeth 1976, 72). Judges, in other
words, are “policy maximizers.” It also assumes that the American political system gives the
justices “enormous latitude” to reach decisions based on these preferences: they have life tenure,
“lack electoral or political accountability, have no ambition for higher office, and comprise a
court of last resort that controls its own caseload” (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 92).
Based on these assumptions, the attitudinal model posits “that the justices decide their
cases on the basis of the interaction of their ideological attitudes and values with the facts of the
case. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., decided cases as he did because he was liberal; Justice
William Rehnquist or Warrant Burger, because they were conservative. In other words, the
justices vote as they do because they want their decisions to reflect their individual policy
preferences” (Spaeth 1995, 305). Assuming that conservative judges are less likely to defer to
foreign governance authority than liberal judges, 13 one might plausibly derive from the
attitudinal model the following hypothesis:
Attitudinal Model Hypothesis (H1): A conservative judge is less likely to defer to foreign
governance authority than a liberal judge.
The strategic model of judicial decisionmaking shares the attitudinal model’s basic
assumption that Supreme Court justices are policy maximizers, positing that “justices, first and
foremost, wish to see their policy preferences etched into law. They are . . . ‘single-minded
seekers of legal policy’” (Epstein and Knight 1998, 9-10). However, in contrast to the attitudinal
model’s emphasis on justices’ “enormous latitude” to make decisions based on their personal
preferences, the strategic model emphasizes the constraints that justices face. To maximize their
preferences, justices must act strategically; that is, they must consider not only their own
13

While not self-evident, this assumption seems plausible in light of recent survey work conducted by the Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press (2005a, 2005b). Of most direct relevance, Republicans overall were
more likely than Democrats to agree that the United States should follow its own national interests even when its
allies strongly disagree, and less likely than Democrats to agree that U.S. foreign policy should take into account the
interests and views of allies (2005a, 21), which is consistent with the assumption that conservatives are less likely to
defer to foreign governance authority. However, only the most ideologically driven groups within each party
expressed views that differ significantly from the national average (2005a, 21). The partisan divide was more
pronounced on other matters that may have a bearing on the likelihood of deference to foreign governance authority.
For example, Republicans were less likely than Democrats to agree that “[t]he U.S. should mind its own business
internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” (2005b, 42). In addition,
Republicans were less likely than Democrats to have confidence in diplomacy (2005a, 21) and less likely than
Democrats to agree that the U.S. “should cooperate fully with the United Nations” (2005b, 42)—attitudes which
seem consistent with less willingness on the part of Republicans to defer to foreign governance authority.
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preferences, but also the preferences and actions of other political actors such as Congress, the
president, and the public, with which the achievement of justices’ policy goals are
interdependent (Epstein and Knight 1998, 12). Simply put, “the choices of justices can best be
explained as strategic behavior, not solely as responses to either personal ideology or apolitical
jurisprudence” (Epstein and Knight 1998, xiii).
An important implication of the strategic model is the political environment has an
influence on judicial decisionmaking. Congress and the president have a “vast array of powers
over matters important to the Court” (George and Epstein 1992, 325). For example, Congress
can propose constitutional amendments or pass legislation overriding court decisions. It also can
use judicial salaries, impeachment, or legislative limits on jurisdiction to “punish” justices for
their decisions—and although this rarely occurs, the possibility of such measures gives justices
an incentive to consider the policy preferences of the other branches (Epstein and Knight 1998,
141-143). In addition, “government actors can refuse, implicitly or explicitly, to implement
particular constitutional decisions, thereby decreasing the Court’s ability to create efficacious
policy” (Epstein and Knight 1998, 144). Thus, the strategic model suggests that “Congress and
the president affect Supreme Court decision making and that the direction of their influence
reflects their partisan composition” (George and Epstein 1992, 325). Again assuming that
conservatives are less likely than liberals to prefer deference to foreign governance authority, the
following hypothesis can be derived from the strategic model of judicial decisionmaking:
Strategic Model Hypothesis (H2): A judge is less likely to defer to foreign governance
authority in a conservative political environment than a liberal political environment.
Realist theories of international relations reinforce the attitudinal and strategic models’
emphasis on the political determinants of transnational judicial governance, but with a focus on
power rather than ideology. Morgenthau (1978, 5) assumes that “statesmen think and act in
terms of interest defined as power”; Waltz (1979, 97-98) argues that the distribution of power
among states is a fundamental structural variable affecting state behavior; and Mearsheimer
(2001, 2) posits that “[t]he overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world
power.” Because realist theory generally treats states as unitary actors, it is not clear from a
realist perspective how national power should affect transnational judicial governance. 14 As a
general matter, however, one might expect the likelihood of deference by one political actor to
another to be greater when the second is more powerful than the first. 15 This implies the
following hypothesis:
Realist Theory Hypothesis (H3): The greater the power of a foreign state, the more likely
a judge is to defer to its governance authority.
Nationality is another political factor that may influence transnational judicial
governance: domestic courts may be biased in favor of their own nationals (Bhattacharya, Galpin
14

However, as Alter (2001, 40) notes, some scholars of European integration argue that the national interest is the
primary determinant of judicial decisionmaking. If this is true, then to the extent power defines national interests, it
also should influence the decisions of courts.
15
The opposite may also be a plausible claim, namely that for fear of reinforcing the power of already more
powerful states, judges may be less likely to defer to them.
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and Haslem 2006; Moore 2003). 16 This “domestic bias” theory implies the following
hypothesis:
Domestic Bias Hypothesis (H4): In a dispute between a domestic party and a foreign
party, a judge is more likely to defer to foreign governance authority if the domestic party
prefers deference and less likely to do so if the domestic party prefers assertion of
domestic governance authority.
Finally, beyond ideology, power and nationality, a fourth potential political factor is
regime type. Drawing on the democratic peace literature (Russett and Oneal 2001) and liberal
international relations theory (Moravcsik 1997), Anne-Marie Slaughter’s liberal theory of
international law posits that “the courts of liberal states handle cases involving other liberal states
differently from the way they handle cases involving nonliberal states” (Burley 1992, 1917). 17
Slaughter argues that “the courts of liberal states will be guided [in their legal relations with each
other] by general pluralist principles of tolerance and mutual accommodation” (Burley 1992,
1923), which implies that domestic courts in liberal democracies should be more likely to defer
to the governance authority of a foreign state when that foreign state also is a liberal democracy.
Alvarez (2001, 214-220) disagrees with Slaughter’s theory, questioning the tenability of the
liberal-illiberal distinction and arguing that the theory simply is not descriptively accurate: the
courts of liberal democracies are not necessarily more deferential to the courts of other liberal
democracies. To evaluate these competing claims, I will test the following hypothesis:
Liberal Theory Hypothesis (H5): A judge in a liberal democracy is more likely to defer to
the governance authority of a foreign state when that foreign state also is a liberal
democracy.

3.2

The Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance

An alternative conception is that transnational judicial governance is characterized not
primarily by politics, but by the rule of law. According to the legal model of judicial
decisionmaking, court decisions are based on the application of legal doctrine to the facts of the
case. 18 Unlike the attitudinal and strategic models, which threats judges as policy maximizers,
the legal model may be understood as treating judges as “law maximizers”: given a particular set
of facts, they make the decision that is most consistent with the applicable doctrine of law. For
example, Segal (1984) develops a legal model of U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking in Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases by surveying the Court’s search and seizure doctrine to
identify a number of specific facts (such as whether the search was of the defendant’s home,
business, car or person) and subsidiary legal conclusions (such as whether there was probable
16

However, empirical support for this proposition is mixed. While Bhattacharya, Galpin and Haslem (2006) and
Moore (2003) find that pro-American bias exists, Clermont and Eisenberg (1996 and 2006) conclude that foreign
parties actually fare better than their U.S. counterparts in U.S. federal courts.
17
She specifically suggests that these differences should be apparent in forum non conveniens decisionmaking
(Slaughter Burley 1993, 232), which is the doctrine I explore in the empirical section of this paper.
18
As characterized by George and Epstein, the legal model posits that “legal doctrine, generated by past cases, is the
primary determinant of extant case outcomes” (1992, 324), and, as described by Segal, Songer and Cameron, it
holds that judges make decisions based on “the facts of the case in light of [the legal] text, intent, and precedent”
(1995, 235).
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cause for the search and whether the search was incident to a lawful arrest) that the doctrine
identifies as relevant to a determination of whether a search or seizure is reasonable. As Segal
clarifies, this type of legal model should not be expected to determine court decisions; but the
identified factors “should strongly predispose the Court toward finding the search reasonable or
unreasonable” (1984, 893) and, in his empirical tests, the model was able to predict accurately a
substantial proportion of the Court’s decisions. 19 To derive from the legal model a precise
hypothesis about transnational judicial governance, reference must be made to an applicable
legal doctrine. However, the legal model does suggest the following general proposition:
Legal Model Hypothesis (H6): When an applicable legal principle states that the
existence of a particular fact requires, or militates in favor of, deference to foreign
governance authority, a judge is more likely to defer to foreign governance authority
when that fact exists than when it does not.
A limitation of the legal model is that it does not explain why legal considerations should
have a stronger influence on transnational judicial governance than the political considerations
emphasized by other theories of judicial decisionmaking. One possible explanation begins with
the observation that the most active courts in transnational judicial governance are trial courts.
But the attitudinal model’s assumption that judges have wide latitude to reach decisions based on
their policy preferences does not hold as well for lower court judges as it does for Supreme Court
justices, because the former face a more constraining strategic environment (Segal, Songer, and
Cameron 1995, 232), including the possibility that higher courts may overrule them for making
legal errors. As Spaeth notes, “[t]hese differences may cause lower-court judges to decide on
bases other than their personal policy preferences” (1995, 313).
Moreover, the decisionmaking demands on U.S. district court judges are higher than for
Supreme Court justices. The workload of courts is heavy for all levels of the federal judiciary
(Carp, Stidham, and Manning 2004, 52); but unlike the Supreme Court, district courts are unable
to control their caseload. Since 1995 there have been approximately 400 to 500 pending cases
per judge in the U.S. district courts each year. 20 Because judicial appointments have not kept
pace with growing dockets, “federal judges, at both the trial and circuit court levels, are under
severe resource and expertise constraints”; they face “an overwhelming caseload and limited
time and resources with which to decide those cases” (Bainbridge and Gulati 2002, 86, 102). As
a result, “a significant portion of [lower court] decision making must be done on the spur of the
moment, without the luxury of lengthy reflection or discussion with staff or colleagues” (Carp,
Stidham, and Manning 2004, 282). Given these limitations on their decisionmaking capacity,
district court judges ordinarily will not gather information about the preferences and likely
decisions of other political actors and make strategic decisions based on analysis of this
information, as assumed by the strategic model. Simply put, they are too busy.
The problem is that the combination of heavy caseload and limited resources may also
limit the plausibility of the legal model. Legal analysis, like strategic analysis, consumes
19

George and Epstein (1992) used the same approach to develop and empirically test a legal model of Supreme
Court decisionmaking in death penalty cases.
20
The data is from the Federal Court Management Statistics published by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html.

Whytock 11
substantial decision-making resources. Just as resource constraints make it difficult for judges to
engage in the type of decisionmaking process described by the strategic model, these constraints
make it difficult for them to engage in the type of decisionmaking process implied by the legal
model, including the collection and analysis of legally relevant facts and the systematic
application of frequently complex legal principles to those facts.
Therefore, as an alternative to the theories discussed above, I propose a heuristics model
of transnational judicial governance that takes into account the limited decisionmaking resources
of trial court judges, and posits that U.S. district court decisions are based largely on
decisionmaking shortcuts or “heuristics.” The theory is premised on three basic assumptions.
The neoclassical concept of rationality assumes that individuals maximize their utility by making
the choice that yields the greatest expected utility, discounted by costs, based on a
comprehensive analysis of available information—which, in the case of uncertainty or
incomplete information, includes the estimation of a probability distribution associated with
outcomes (Jones 1999, 299). In contrast, following Bainbridge and Gulati (2002) and Segal
(1986), I assume that judges are boundedly rational decision makers: that is, they are goaloriented, but due to their cognitive limitations—particularly their limited ability to gather and
process information—they are unable to maximize in the neoclassical sense. Because boundedly
rational actors cannot maximize, they satisfice: that is, the decisionmaking process is “usually
terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses of action” (Simon 1985, 295).
Thus, whereas the legal model treats judges as law maximizers, the heuristics model understands
them as “law satisficers.”
Second, one way that boundedly rational actors satisfice is by using decisionmaking
shortcuts called “heuristics.” In the language of cognitive psychology, heuristics involve a
process of “attribute substitution”: “whenever the aspect of the judgmental object that one
intends to judge (the target attribute) is less readily assessed than a related property that yields a
plausible answer (the heuristic attribute),” individuals may substitute the former with the latter
(Kahneman and Frederick 2005, 269). The relative accessibility of heuristics—in terms of lower
information gathering or information processing demands—reduces decisionmaking costs, thus
helping decision makers conserve decisionmaking resources. Bainbridge and Gulati (2002),
Guthrie, Rachlinksi, and Wistrich (2001) and Segal (1986) have all found that judicial
decisionmaking relies heavily on heuristics “to cut down on comprehensive decision making”
(Segal 1986, 941), and this makes sense, especially at the district court level where, as discussed
above, judges face a particularly acute combination of high decisionmaking demands and limited
decisionmaking capacity. 21 When an applicable legal doctrine specifies the factors for making a
particular type of legal decision, these factors can be understood as the relevant target attributes.
From this perspective, bounded rationality suggests that if assessing the doctrinally-specified
target attributes requires too much information gathering or cognitive effort, judges will replace
them with heuristic attributes that are conceptually related and provide plausible answers, but
entail lower decision costs. 22 In plain English, “difficult questions are often answered by
21

As Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich note, “judges make decisions under uncertain, time-pressured conditions that
encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts” (2001, 783).
22
For example, Segal noted that more than 100 legal factors are relevant to search and seizure decisionmaking by
U.S. Supreme Court justices, but found the justices in fact “monitor a relatively small number of facts from the case,
and that the presence or absence of these facts strongly predisposes the justice in his decision” (1986, 942).
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substituting an answer to an easier one” (Kahneman and Frederick 2005, 269). More precisely
for this study, judges may replace answers to difficult legal questions with answers to related but
relatively simple questions.
Third, I assume that the primary operative goal of district court judges is to dispose of the
cases on their docket efficiently and in a legally competent manner (Bainbridge and Gulati 2002,
86; Baum 1994, 751). 23 This assumption has both instrumental and normative foundations.
Instrumentally, one goal of judges is to maintain a good professional reputation in the legal
community, particularly among other judges (Bainbridge and Gulati 2002, 106-108; Baum 1994,
751-753; Posner 1993, 15). To accomplish this goal, judges must dispose of the cases on their
docket without excessive delay and in a legally competent manner. Failure to do so will attract
negative attention, damaging a judge’s reputation. 24 In addition, institutional approaches to
judicial decisionmaking suggest that one of the norms constituting the institution of judging is
the norm of judging in good faith (Gillman 1999, 80; Gillman 2001, 486), 25 a norm that implies
not only good faith legal reasoning but also expeditiousness. 26 Thus, both a logic of
consequences and a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998) point to the goal of
efficient and legally competent disposal of cases. This helps explain why political considerations
may not weigh as heavily in transnational judicial governance as implied by other theories.
Given these three assumptions, which heuristics are U.S. district court judges likely to
use in transnational judicial governance decisionmaking? Such a heuristic must satisfy two basic
conditions. First, it must be easier for judges to use as a basis for decision than the full set of
doctrinally-specified factors. That is, the heuristic must reduce decision costs by being more
accessible than the target attribute. This requirement is definitional, for an attribute that entails
greater decision costs than the target attribute is not a decisionmaking shortcut at all. Moreover,
given the goal of judges to dispose of cases efficiently in the face of limited decisionmaking
resources and high decisionmaking demands, they have an incentive to use processes that reduce
decision costs, but not those that increase decision costs, all else being equal. Second, given the
goal of judges to make competent legal decisions, the heuristic must not tend to produce

23

Some attitudinal and strategic modelers may find this assumption difficult to accept. Epstein and Knight (1998,
45) explain that “[w]hile some justices may be motivated to be ‘good’ justices, we think it is difficult to maintain a
proposition suggesting that this idea is in the minds of most [Supreme Court] justices in most cases.” However, as
Spaeth (1995, 313) notes, the situation might be different for lower court judges, and there is evidence that legal
influences may be particularly significant at the district court level (Unah 1998, 103). Moreover, as March and
Olsen (1998, 952) suggest, normative bases for human behavior are likely to be particularly important under
conditions of bounded rationality: “When identities and their implications are clear but the implications of
preferences or expected consequences are not, a logic of appropriateness tends to be more important.” On the
distinction between the inherent and operative goals of judges, see Baum (1994, 749-750).
24
As Murphy, Pritchett and Epstein note, “[f]ew jurists have the temerity (or stupidity) to expose themselves to the
scorn of fellow judges, scholars, and journalists by announcing decisions for which they cannot give good, even if
controversial, reasons” (2002, 312).
25
As Kahn explains, “the constitutive approach [to the study of courts] assumes that justices make their decisions in
an institutional context which informs the choices that they make” (1999, 175-176).
26
For example, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives criminal defendants the right to a “speedy”
trial. Thus, to Gillman’s description of the norm of good faith judging as “a sense of obligation to make the best
decision possible in light of one’s general training and sense of professional obligation” (2001, 486), I would add
“and in light of one’s highly limited decisionmaking resources.”
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decisions that clearly are legally erroneous. 27 An implication of this two-fold requirement is that
the more closely the heuristic attribute is related to the doctrinally-specified decisionmaking
factors, the lower the error costs will be, but the lower the decision costs savings will be as well.
In summary, judges are likely to use a heuristic only if it will help them dispose of their cases
more quickly and easily than comprehensive decisionmaking based on the doctrinally-specified
decisionmaking factors (it must reduce decisionmaking costs), without tending to yield decisions
that clearly are legally erroneous under the applicable doctrine (it must not entail excessive error
costs)—these are the scope conditions of the heuristic model.
One heuristic for transnational judicial governance decisionmaking that may satisfy these
requirements is territoriality. According to the territoriality heuristic, the choice between
domestic and foreign governance authority over transnational activity will depend on whether
that activity is primarily outside domestic territory. In the language of cognitive psychology, the
target attributes of choice between domestic and foreign governance authority—including those
factors identified by relatively complex doctrines of private international law—are replaced by
the more simple and accessible heuristic attribute of territoriality. 28 This is not to say that it
always is easy for judges to determine the principal locus of transnational activity. 29
Nevertheless, use of the territorial heuristic is on average likely to entail lower decision costs
than the comprehensive application of relevant principles of private international law and, given
the relationship of territoriality with many of these principles, the heuristic should not entail
excessive error costs. 30 The extent to which decision costs will be reduced, and the extent to
which error costs will be minimized, ultimately cannot be analyzed with precision outside the
context of a particular legal doctrine. However, assuming the decision costs and error costs
conditions are satisfied, the heuristics model suggests the following hypothesis:

27

More generally, as Kahneman and Frederick note, a heuristic must be a property that is related to the target and
“yields a plausible answer” (2005, 269). Some scholars focus on heuristics as a form of conscious adaptation to
cognitive constraints, while others focus on them as “unwitting” adaptations (Kahneman and Frederick 2005, 269).
As Bainbridge and Gulati note, the former approach is associated with new institutional economics and the latter
with behavioral economics (2001, 101-102, n. 60). I do not take a firm position on whether judicial heuristics are
primarily conscious or unwitting adaptations, but I do assume that trial court judges will learn through the appellate
process about the extent of error costs associated with a heuristic and after reversals are likely to reassess it
consciously. Therefore, whether or not heuristics are initially conscious adaptations, I expect that those that are
actually used by judges generally will not entail excessive error costs.
28
Broadly understood, private international law consists of private law, including the law of property, contracts, and
torts, as it is applied to transnational activity; as well as the legal principles that guide how domestic courts allocate
governance authority. The latter include the three major branches of a subfield of law known in the United States as
“conflict of laws”: jurisdiction and proper venue, which guides the allocation of adjudicative authority; choice of
law, which guides the allocation of prescriptive authority; and enforcement and recognition of judgments, which
guides the allocation of enforcement authority (Scoles, Hay, Borchers, and Symeonides 2004, 3).
29
Determining the locus of transnational activity may be particularly difficult in disputes relating to cyberspace.
See, e.g., Berman (2005) and Michaels (2004) (each highlighting the difficulties that cyberspace poses territorial
approaches to private international law).
30
For example, “most significant relationship” analysis under the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the
personal jurisdiction and forum inconvenience analysis under the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments
Recognition Act and, as discussed below, several elements of forum non conveniens analysis, are all likely to be
significantly correlated with the location of the transnational activity. More broadly, territoriality has played an
important historical role in private international law (Symeonides, Perdue, and Von Mehren 2003, 296).
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Heuristics Model Hypothesis (H7): A judge is more likely to defer to foreign governance
authority over transnational activity when that activity is primarily outside domestic
territory.
In summary, there is theoretical support both for the proposition that transnational
judicial governance is based on politics and for the proposition that it is based on the rule of law.
My own intuition, expressed in the heuristics model, takes seriously the insight from institutional
approaches to judicial decisionmaking that judges generally abide by a norm of judging in good
faith. My model thus provides an explanation for why political factors may not play the
important role implied by other theories of judicial decisionmaking and international relations.
However, in contrast to the legal model, my model assumes that because of their highly limited
decisionmaking resources, judges generally are not able to apply the law systematically to the
facts of the case in order to generate decisions—that is, they are unable to behave as “law
maximizers.” They are more appropriately described as “law satisficers,” boundedly rational
actors who use heuristics to make decisions efficiently and in a manner that is legally competent.
Transnational judicial governance may be based on the rule of law, but it is the rule of law
constrained by the reality of limited resources.

4.

Research Design: Forum Non Conveniens and Transnational Judicial
Governance Decisionmaking in U.S. District Courts

To empirically test the hypotheses developed above, and to evaluate the descriptive
accuracy of the politics and rule-of-law visions of transnational judicial governance, I conducted
statistical and qualitative analyses of an original database of over 200 forum non conveniens
decisions in U.S. federal district courts. As explained below, forum non conveniens
decisionmaking involves an explicit choice between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority
over transnational activity, making it an important example of transnational judicial governance.

4.1

Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Allocation of Adjudicative
Authority

In the context of a particular transnational dispute, the process of allocating adjudicative
authority begins with one of the parties to that dispute, the plaintiff, who initially chooses where
to initiate the lawsuit. A standard move on the part of defendants in transnational litigation is to
seek to have the case removed from the plaintiff’s preferred forum. One way to do this is to file
a motion asking the judge to dismiss the case on the grounds that it lacks jurisdiction over the
defendant or the subject matter of the dispute. However, even if the judge finds that the court
does have jurisdiction, another technique is available: the defendant can file a motion asking the
judge to dismiss the case in favor of a more appropriate foreign court. The doctrine of forum
non conveniens gives U.S. district courts the discretion to grant such motions—that is, to dismiss
transnational litigation in favor of a foreign court, thus deferring to foreign adjudicative
authority, even if the domestic court has jurisdiction—and it provides the legal principles upon
which the court is to base this decision. 31
31

For detailed discussions of the forum non conveniens doctrine, see Born (1996, chap. 4) and Wright, Miller, and
Cooper (2007, 614-746).
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A detailed description of the forum non conveniens doctrine is presented in Appendix B.
For the purposes of this study, however, the essential point is that the doctrine calls on U.S.
district courts to make a choice between the assertion of domestic adjudicative authority and
deference to foreign adjudicative authority over transnational activity. As explained in the
seminal U.S. Supreme Court case on the doctrine, “[i]n all cases in which the doctrine of forum
non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.” 32 And this choice
matters. As Bermann (2003, 90) explains, “With the movement of a case to an internationally
different forum are likely to come into play significant and possibly outcome-determinate
changes in the applicable procedural or substantive law, including available causes of action, and
remedies. Even where two systems have the same textual rules in place, the same result may not
obtain due to differences in interpretation of these rules or in the respective courts’
characterizations of the facts. Thus, forum non conveniens may prove to be quite a high-stakes
game indeed when deployed in the transnational litigation context.” 33
Forum non conveniens decisionmaking is an interesting example of transnational judicial
governance not only because it involves the allocation of adjudicative authority among states and
because choice of forum matters profoundly for transnational actors, but also because it is
common. I estimate that U.S. district courts have published at least 691 transnational forum non
conveniens decisions between 1990 and 2006, with 95 percent certainty that the actual minimum
is between 613 and 775. 34 Moreover, the rate of forum non conveniens dismissals poses a bit of
a theoretical puzzle. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that U.S. district courts
ordinarily should respect a plaintiff’s choice of forum and that dismissal on forum non

32

Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), at 506-507. Although personal jurisdiction raises important issues of
transnational judicial governance, forum non conveniens doctrine is particularly well suited for empirically
exploring how U.S. federal courts allocate governance authority because, unlike motions to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, court decisions on forum non conveniens motions involve this explicit choice between
domestic and foreign adjudicative authority.
33
Clermont and Eisenberg (1995) find that forum affects outcomes even within the U.S. federal court system:
plaintiffs’ win rates drop substantially when litigation is transferred from their preferred federal venue to another
federal venue. Thus, Clermont (2004, 8) argues that “[t]he choice of forum has a tremendous impact on the chance
of winning and hence on the value of settlement . . . . The choice of forum becomes much more important [in
international litigation]. Shifting inconveniences and changing biases become staggeringly effective. Moreover, the
differences in substantive and procedural law—as well as the matters of remedies and expenses—dwarf the small
variations within American law.” Born (1996, 318) notes that “[i]n many cases, the forum non conveniens decision
is dispositive, as a practical matter, of the parties’ dispute. If the case is dismissed, the plaintiff will effectively
capitulate, while the defendant will often settle on generous terms (by international standards) if the case is not
dismissed.”
34
By published, I mean cases published either electronically in the Lexis/Nexis Academic database or in official
reporters. The total number of cases in the Lexis/Nexis database containing the phrase “forum non conveniens”
from 1990 through 2005 was, as of September 28, 2006, 2,791. I analyzed a random sample of 848 of these cases
and, after discarding magistrate decisions and purely domestic cases applying the Section 1404(a) federal transfer
statute under the misleading label of “forum non conveniens,” I identified 210 actual transnational forum non
conveniens decisions, resulting in a “success” rate of 24.76 percent (95% Agresti-Coull confidence interval
[.2197487, .2778104]). As discussed above, published decisions are the primary cases of interest from a governance
perspective because of their potential to affect the strategic behavior of transnational actors, but it should be noted
that these figures may substantially underestimate the total number of forum non conveniens decisions because they
do not include unpublished decisions.
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conveniens grounds should be rare, 35 and legal scholars have noted the “high hurdle” facing
defendants seeking forum non conveniens dismissals (Bermann 2003, 93). In addition, theories
of judicial decisionmaking that treat judges as “policy maximizers” or “jurisdiction maximizers”
imply that dismissals should be rare, because by dismissing transnational cases, judges forego
opportunities to influence transnational activity. 36 In contrast to these expectations, I estimate
that in 47 percent of published forum non conveniens decisions, U.S. district courts grant the
motion, thus dismissing the case in favor of a foreign court, with 95 percent certainty that the
actual rate is between 41 and 54 percent (see Table 1 below). One should not, however, attribute
too much legal meaning to this estimate without understanding potential selection effects. 37
Although it is possible that the high dismissal rate indicates unfaithful application of Supreme
Court precedents, an alternative explanation might simply be that plaintiffs file a
disproportionate number of the transnational cases in U.S. district courts under factual
circumstances which genuinely merit dismissal under the doctrine.
Table 1: Forum Non Conveniens Decisions by U.S. District Court Judges, 1990-2005

Assert Domestic Governance
Authority (Deny Motion)
Defer to Foreign Governance
Authority (Grant Motion)
Total

Frequency
111

Percent
52.86

99

47.14

210

100.00

Note: Agresti-Coull 95% Confidence Interval for Foreign Court: 40.5 to 53.9 percent.

Finally, the forum non conveniens doctrine provides an appropriate domain for testing
the heuristics model hypothesis because the territorial heuristic would appear to satisfy both the
decision costs and error costs conditions. 38 Forum non conveniens is a fairly complex legal
35

In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that “unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” 330 U.S. 501, at 508 (1947).
36
In addition to the attitudinal and strategic models discussed above, Alter (2001, 45-46) argues that “[j]udges are
primarily interested in promoting their independence, influence, and authority. . . . By influence, I mean that courts
want to promote their ability to make decisions that can influence the policy process and the judicial process. . . . By
authority, I mean that judges protect their legal turf (their jurisdiction) and the finality of their decisions.”
37
For a discussion of the difficulties that selection effects pose for the interpretation of win rates in litigation, see
Clermont and Eisenberg (2002).
38
As Geddes (2003, 96) explains, “[t]he appropriate universe of observations on which to test a hypothesis depends
on the domain implied by the hypothesis.” The domain of the heuristics model hypothesis is restricted to settings in
which the decision costs and error costs conditions are satisfied. Forum non conveniens is one such setting. Testing
the heuristics model hypothesis in such a setting does not pose a selection bias problem, because there is no a priori
theoretical reason to expect heuristics to have an impact outside this domain. Indeed, testing the hypothesis outside
its domain would create a different threat to inference, namely the risk of violating the assumption of causal
homogeneity (Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004, 88). Of course, one must use caution extending this study’s
findings about heuristics in forum non conveniens decisionmaking to judicial decisionmaking in general, and
without further empirical analysis, even extending the inferences to other examples of judicial decisionmaking
within the theory’s domain must be done carefully.
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doctrine, the thorough application of which requires a judge not only to determine the
availability and adequacy of the alternative forum proposed by the defendant, but also to
consider and balance a range of private and public interest factors (see Appendix B). In contrast,
the territorial heuristic requires only that the judge reach a conclusion about whether the
underlying transnational activity occurred mostly or entirely outside U.S. territory. By replacing
the target attributes identified by the forum non conveniens doctrine with the relatively simple
and accessible heuristic attribute of territoriality, judges should be able to reduce the
decisionmaking costs of choosing between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority.
Regarding error costs, the forum non conveniens doctrine does not refer to the locus of
the transnational activity that gives rise to a dispute. However, the locus of transnational activity
generally should be significantly correlated with several factors that are included in the doctrine.
For example, ease of access to evidence, which is emphasized by the doctrine’s private interest
factors, depends on the location of relevant documents and witnesses, which in turn will often
overlap with the place of the activity giving rise to the dispute. In addition, one of the public
interest factors is whether the underlying dispute is a “localized controversy.” The meaning of
the phrase is not defined, but it implies that one of the parties or some part of the underlying
activity is local. Therefore, substituting the territoriality heuristic for the target attributes
identified in the forum non conveniens doctrine should not entail excessive error costs, allowing
judges to make decisions that, in light of their resource constraints, are satisfactory from the
perspective of good faith judging.

4.2

Sample and Dependent Variable

My hypothesis tests are based on analysis of a random sample of more than 200
published forum non conveniens decisions made between 1990 and 2005. 39 My dependent
variable, “Deference to Foreign Governance Authority,” indicates whether the court decided to
assert domestic adjudicative authority by denying the defendant’s forum non conveniens motion
and keeping the case (0), or defer to foreign adjudicative authority by granting the motion and
dismissing the case in favor of a foreign court (1). The independent variables are explained
below, and summary statistics are reported in Appendix A.

39

My sample of forum non conveniens decisions was generated in three steps. First, I searched the LexisNexis
Academic database of U.S. district court decisions for the term “forum non conveniens.” I then randomly sorted
them. Finally, I analyzed each case in the randomly generated order, discarding those that were not actual decisions
by U.S. district court judges to either grant or deny a motion to dismiss in favor of a foreign court on forum non
conveniens grounds, until I had a sample of approximately 200 observations. This screening approach follows
Koremenos’ approach to generating a random sample of international agreements (2005, 554). The exact number of
observations in my dataset is 210. To obtain this number, I had to screen 848 cases out of a total of 2,791 hits for
the search term “forum non conveniens.” Thus, I estimate that there are a total of 691 actual forum non conveniens
decisions in the LexisNexis database between 1990 and 2005, with my dataset constituting 30% of those decisions.
Discarded cases included those deciding motions to transfer from one U.S. district court to another under Section
1406(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code rather than to dismiss in favor of a foreign court; decisions made by
magistrate judges rather than district court judges (except in two cases where the magistrate was authorized to make
the final order); and those in which a forum non conveniens issue was discussed, but no forum non conveniens
motion was granted or denied. Decisions granting motions to dismiss on alternative grounds including forum non
conveniens were included in the dataset.
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4.3

Independent Variables

To test the attitudinal model hypothesis (H1), I used the variable “Republican Judge,”
which indicates whether the judge’s party affiliation is Republican (0 if no, 1 if yes). 40 To test
the strategic model hypothesis (H2), I used the variable “Republican Environment,” which
indicates whether, in the year of the court’s decision, the political environment is Republican (0
if no, 1 if yes). I coded the political environment as Republican if the president and at least one
house of Congress were Republican, and as not Republican if the president was Democratic or
both houses of Congress were Democratic. 41 For the realist theory hypothesis (H3), I used the
foreign state’s annual gross domestic product (“Foreign State’s GDP”) and its total annual
military spending (“Foreign State’s Military Spending”). 42 To test the domestic bias hypothesis
(H4), I used two dummy variables, one indicating whether there is a plaintiff that is a U.S.
citizen (“Domestic Plaintiff,” 0 if no, 1 if yes), and the other indicating whether there is a
defendant that is a U.S. citizen (“Domestic Defendant,” 0 if no, 1 if yes). 43 Because a forum non
conveniens motion is an attempt by the defendant to thwart the plaintiff’s choice of forum, one
would expect the presence of a U.S. plaintiff to decrease the likelihood of dismissal and the
presence of a U.S. defendant to increase the likelihood of dismissal. To test the liberal theory
hypothesis (H5), I used the variable “Liberal Democracy,” which indicates whether the foreign
state was rated “Free” by the Freedom House Freedom in the World Survey for the year prior to
the court’s decision (0 if no, 1 if yes). 44
40

The use of party affiliation as a measure for a judge’s ideology follows George and Epstein (1992, 328) and
George (1998, 1651-1652). To create the variable, I began by using the political party of the nominating president
as a proxy for the judge’s political party, again following George and Epstein (1992, 328) and George (1998, 16511652), using data from the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Federal Judges available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj. I then made corrections when Martinek’s (2005) Lower Federal Court
Confirmation Database contained data on a judge’s personal partisan identification that was different from that of
the nominating president, which was the case for 18 observations in my dataset.
41
This approach is based on George and Epstein’s (1992, 328) method of measuring the political environment,
although I use a dummy variable rather than their three-level measure to ensure adequate cell size for the logit
analysis. For simplification and to account for lame-duck status, I did not account for January when coding
presidential transition years. For the Senate, I coded 2001 and 2002 as Democratic, because Democrats were in the
majority for 8 of 12 months in 2001 and 11 of 12 months in 2002.
42
This approach follows Guzman and Simmons (2005). I use data for the year 2000 and apply a natural logarithmic
transformation to improve symmetry. The data source is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators,
available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/. I only report results using Foreign State’s GDP because
Foreign State’s Military Spending was not statistically significant in any of my tests, it has more missing data than
Foreign State’s GDP and, except as otherwise noted below, using it instead of Foreign State’s GDP as a measure of
power did not change the level of statistical significance of any other variables included in my models.
43
I coded these variables based on the citizenship of the plaintiffs indicated in the court’s opinion or, in the absence
of citizenship information, based on residence or jurisdiction of incorporation. I counted only parties that joined in
or opposed the forum non conveniens motion.
44
Although these ratings generally are stable over time during the period covered by my dataset, I use a one-year lag
on the theory that a boundedly rational judge is unlikely to become immediately aware of even substantial changes
in a foreign state’s politics. For purposes of her theory, Slaughter defines “liberal” states as those “with juridical
equality, constitutional protections of individual rights, representative republican governments, and market
economies based on private property rights” (Burley 1992, 1909). The Freedom House rankings capture these
characteristics quite nicely, by explicitly accounting for equal treatment under the law, protection of individual
rights (including freedoms of assembly, open public discussion, and defendants’ rights), representative government
(including election of representatives through free and fair elections and other political rights), and private property
rights (Freedom House 2006). The other leading measure of democracy, Polity IV, captures the concept of
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As Appendix B explains, of the three main elements of the forum non conveniens
doctrine—the level of deference owed to plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. court, the availability and
adequacy of the foreign court proposed by the defendant, and the balance of private and public
interest factors—only the first provides a basis for deriving a statistical test of the legal model
hypothesis (H6). As the Supreme Court stated in Piper v. Reyno (1981), “a plaintiff’s choice of
forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum. When the
home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the
plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. Because the central
purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign
plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.” 45 Thus, the citizenship of the plaintiff is a specific
doctrinally-relevant fact which should, according to the legal model, influence the choice
between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority in the forum non conveniens context. To
test this hypothesis, I use the Domestic Plaintiff and Domestic Defendant dummy variables
described above. If the doctrinal bias in favor of U.S. plaintiffs is influencing the choice
between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority, then the plaintiff’s nationality variable
should have an effect. However, if there is a general bias in favor of U.S. parties that goes
beyond that permitted by doctrine, as implied by the domestic bias hypothesis (H4), then both
dummy variables should have an effect.
I used two alternative variables to test the heuristics model hypothesis (H7). First, I used
the “Territoriality (Place)” variable, which indicates whether the place of the activity giving rise
to the transnational litigation was all or mostly outside U.S. territory (0 if no, 1 if yes). I coded
the variable based on two factors, the place of the conduct of the defendant complained of by the
plaintiff, and the place of the plaintiff’s alleged injury, each as stated in the court’s opinion. I
coded the place variable as “yes” if both the place of conduct and the place of injury were
entirely foreign, if the place of conduct was entirely foreign and the place of injury mixed, or if
the place of injury was entirely foreign and the place of conduct mixed. When the place of
conduct and place of injury were both mixed or all or mostly inside U.S. territory, I coded the
place variable as “no,” because under these circumstances the territoriality heuristic is not
expected to point toward dismissing the case in favor of a foreign court.
As an alternative measure, I used the “Territoriality (Contacts)” variable, which I based
on a count of the number of statements in the court’s opinion referring to actions or things
located inside U.S. territory and outside U.S. territory. The variable equals the percentage of
these contacts that are foreign. This measure counts only statements about the activity giving
rise to the transnational litigation. For two reasons, it excludes statements about the location of
evidence and witnesses and the location of the parties during the litigation. First, because the
theoretical concept of interest is the locus of the activity giving rise to the parties’ dispute,
including these statements would result in measurement error. Second, because these statements
are directly related to the private interest factors enumerated in the forum non conveniens
doctrine, including them would make it difficult for the variable to distinguish heuristic effects
from legal effects.
representative government well, but only indirectly captures the other elements of Slaughter’s definition. Therefore,
for testing Slaughter’s liberal theory of international law, the Freedom House measure is more appropriate.
45
454 U.S. 235, 266.
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I control for two additional variables for which there are theoretical grounds to expect an
influence on judicial decisionmaking in this context. First, recent scholarship on the U.S.
Supreme Court and the U.S. courts of appeals has identified case salience as a factor influencing
judicial decisionmaking (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004; Unah and Hancock 2006).
As Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek (2004, 130) argue in their study of dissenting behavior by
appellate court judges, “the more salient a case is, the more likely it is to have policy
consequences and, hence, the more likely it is to stimulate judges to devote the necessary effort
to write a dissenting opinion.” This reasoning implies that judges also should be less likely to
grant motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds in cases that raise particularly salient
legal issues. To control for salience, I used two variables. “Federal Statute” indicates whether
the dispute involved an issue under a U.S. federal statute (0 if no, 1 if yes), on the theory that
U.S. district court judges are likely to find such issues more important than state common law
and state statutory issues such as those common in ordinary personal injury and commercial
litigation. “Political” indicates whether the dispute involved human rights or other politically
salient transnational issues (0 if no, 1 if yes). 46
Caseload may also have an influence on lower court judicial decisionmaking, although
the evidence is mixed (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004, 134). In the case of forum non
conveniens decisionmaking, the implication would be that busier U.S. district courts are more
likely to dismiss litigation in favor of a foreign court because this allows them to reduce their
caseload. In fact, by including “[a]dministrative difficulties” resulting from congestion in its list
of public interest factors, the Supreme Court in Gilbert v. Gulf Oil (1947) can even be
understood as acknowledging that the forum non conveniens doctrine may be used as a caseload
management tool. To control for caseload effects, I used the variable “Caseload,” which
measures the number of cases filed in each district in the year prior to the court’s decision. 47

5.

Results and Discussion

5.1

Politics or Rule of Law? A Statistical Analysis

To empirically assess the influence of the political and rule-of-law factors discussed
above on the choice between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority in forum non
conveniens decisionmaking, I conducted a series of logit analyses, the results of which are
presented in Table 2 below.
46

I coded these variables based on the description of the legal issues in the court’s opinion. Because Political equals
1 in only nineteen cases, some of the cells in the cross-tabulation of Political and my dependent variable may be
insufficiently populated for logit analysis to be reliable (e.g. only 5 observations with Deference to Foreign
Authority=1 and Political=1 and only 14 observations with Deference to Foreign Authority=0 and Political=1).
Therefore, my logit table only reports results using the Federal Statute measure of salience. Except as otherwise
noted, Political was not statistically significant and using it instead of Federal Statute did not change the level of
statistical significance of other variables in my models.
47
I use the natural logarithm of the “weighted filings per judgeship” figure from the Federal Judicial Center’s
Federal Court Management Statistics, Judicial Caseload Profiles, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html, in the year prior to the court’s decision. I use a one-year lag on the
theory that because of the duration of cases, the prior year’s filings are likely to be a more accurate measure of the
district’s current workload. I applied the logarithmic transformation to increase symmetry.
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Table 2. Logit Analysis, Dependent Variable: Deference to Foreign Governance Authority
(Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal)
Independent Variable
Republican Judge

Republican Environment

Domestic Plaintiff

Domestic Defendant

Foreign State's GDP (log)

Liberal Democracy

Model 1
(Politics)
-0.477
(0.333)
[0.152]
-0.686
(0.361)
[0.057]
-1.826***
(0.385)
[0.000]
-0.394
(0.370)
[0.287]
-0.082
(0.097)
[0.400]
1.262**
(0.438)
[0.004]

Territoriality (Place)

Model 2
(Rule of Law)

-1.017**
(0.330)
[0.002]

1.586***
(0.337)
[0.000]

Model 3
(Full Model)
-0.531
(0.365)
[0.146]
-0.633
(0.394)
[0.108]
-1.435***
(0.415)
[0.001]
-0.480
(0.403)
[0.233]
0.025
(0.106)
[0.811]
1.432**
(0.465)
[0.002]
1.861***
(0.395)
[0.000]

Territoriality (Contacts)

Federal Statute

Caseload (log)

Constant

Number of Observations
LR Chi2
Prob.>LR Chi2

Model 4
(Full Model)
-0.519
(0.363)
[0.152]
-0.562
(0.398)
[0.157]
-1.765***
(0.416)
[0.000]
-0.335
(0.403)
[0.406]
-0.015
(0.107)
[0.891]
1.348**
(0.472)
[0.004]

-0.187
(0.356)
[0.600]
0.279
(0.668)
[0.676]
-0.010
(4.244)
[0.998]

-0.547
(0.354)
[0.122]
-0.121
(0.630)
[0.847]
0.445
(3.863)
[0.908]

-0.442
(0.399)
[0.268]
0.068
(0.713)
[0.924]
-1.243
(4.503)
[0.782]

4.270***
(0.900)
[0.000]
-0.391
(0.387)
[0.312]
0.216
(0.722)
[0.765]
-3.139
(4.653)
[0.500]

193
37.025
0.000

203
46.826
0.000

191
63.103
0.000

193
65.709
0.000

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 1 is a “political” model of transnational judicial governance, including variables
measuring the judge’s ideology, the political environment, the nationality of the parties, the
foreign state’s power, and the foreign state’s democracy rating, along with control variables for
salience and caseload. The results are mixed. On the one hand, they support the liberal theory
hypothesis (H5): the positive sign of the coefficient for Liberal Democracy indicates that the
probability of deference to foreign adjudicative authority is higher when the foreign state is a
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liberal democracy, and the effect is statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level.48 In
addition, the negative sign of the coefficient for Republican Environment suggests that a
Republican political environment may decrease the probability of deference, but because this
effect is only significant at a 90 percent confidence level, this provides only mild support for the
strategic model hypothesis (H2). 49 On the other hand, and contrary to the attitudinal model
hypothesis (H1) and the realist theory hypothesis (H3), neither the judge’s political party nor the
foreign state’s economic power has a statistically significant effect on the probability of
deference to foreign adjudicative authority. The results also suggest that contrary to the
domestic bias hypothesis (H4), there is no general bias in U.S. federal courts toward domestic
parties in forum non conveniens decisionmaking. While the presence of a domestic plaintiff
decreases the likelihood of deference to foreign adjudicative authority, the nationality of the
defendant does not have a statistically significant effect.
Model 2 is a “rule of law” model of transnational judicial governance. It includes the
Domestic Plaintiff variable indicating the nationality of the plaintiff which, as discussed above,
is a factor that the forum non conveniens doctrine explicitly indicates should have a bearing on
the choice between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority. It also includes the
Territoriality (Place) measuring the locus of transnational activity which, according to my
heuristics model hypothesis (H7), is a heuristic that judges use to choose between domestic and
foreign governance authority in a manner that reduces decision costs but nevertheless is legally
competent. Like Model 1, Model 2 includes the salience and caseload controls. Consistent with
the legal model hypothesis (H6), the presence of a domestic plaintiff reduces the probability of
deference to foreign adjudicative authority, and this effect is statistically significant at a 99
percent level of confidence. The results also provide strong support for the heuristics model
hypothesis (H7): the positive coefficient for the Territoriality (Place) variable indicates that the
probability of deference is higher when the transnational activity occurred primarily outside U.S.
territory, and the effect is significant above the 99 percent level of confidence.
Model 3 combines the political and rule-of-law factors. The results suggest that among
the political factors, only democracy has a statistically significant effect on the choice between
domestic and foreign adjudicative authority, while both of the rule-of-law factors—the plaintiff’s
nationality and the place of the transnational activity—have their hypothesized effects and are
highly statistically significant. The Federal Statute variable, which I use to control for salience,
is not statistically significant. Nor is the Caseload control variable, which suggests that U.S.
district courts do not use forum non conveniens decisionmaking as a docket management tool.
These basic results do not change when Territoriality (Place) is replaced by Territoriality

48

That is, the p-value indicates that there is less than a 1 percent (.01) probability that the apparent relationship
between the explanatory and dependent variable is a result of Type I error (i.e., that the null hypothesis—that there
is no relationship between the explanatory and dependent variable—is true, and the relationship suggested by the
coefficient simply is a result of chance). Political scientists generally do not consider an effect to be statistically
significant if the p-value is greater than .05 (i.e. if there is more than a 5 percent likelihood of Type I error).
49
Republican Environment becomes statistically significant at a 95% confidence level when the foreign state’s
power is measured by Foreign State’ Military Spending rather than Foreign State’s GDP in the political model, but
this does not occur when the same substitution is made in the full model (Models 3 and 4).
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(Contacts). 50 Thus, the choice between domestic and foreign governance authority appears to be
based on a combination of a political factor—whether the foreign state is a liberal democracy—
and rule-of-law factors, including the plaintiff’s nationality and the territoriality heuristic.
But which factors are substantively most important? Table 3 provides estimates of the
impact that a change in each statistically significant independent variable has on the probability
of deference to foreign adjudicative authority in forum non conveniens decisionmaking, and for
each estimate it also provides the 95 percent confidence interval. 51 U.S. district courts are an
estimated 32 percent more likely to defer to the adjudicative authority of foreign states that are
liberal democracies than those that are not, with 95 percent certainty that the actual increase in
probability is between 10 and 52 percent. They are an estimated 21 percent less likely to defer to
foreign adjudicative authority when a plaintiff is a U.S. citizen, with 95 percent certainty that the
actual decrease is between 9 and 36 percent. The strongest substantive impact is from the place
of the transnational activity: U.S. district courts are an estimated 42 percent more likely to defer
to foreign adjudicative authority when the underlying transnational activity occurred all or
mostly outside U.S. territory, with 95 percent certainty that the actual increase is between 25 and
56 percent.
Table 3. Simulated Effects of Independent Variable Changes on Probability of Deference to
Foreign Adjudicative Authority
Independent Variable

Value Change

Liberal Democracy

noÆyes

Probability
Change
.322

95% Confidence
Interval
[.103, .515]

Domestic Plaintiff

noÆyes

-.205

[-.359, -.092]

Territoriality (Place)

noÆyes

.421

[.251, .564]

Notes: For each change in a variable’s value, all other variables are held constant at their modes if they are dummy
variables and at their means if they are continuous variables.

Moreover, the rule-of-law model overall appears to do a better job predicting actual
decisions than the politics model. Table 4 compares various measures of fit for Model 1
(Politics) and Model 2 (Rule of Law), with observations with missing data dropped to ensure that
the tests are run on the same samples. The rule-of-law model correctly classifies the choice
between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority approximately 6 percent more often than
the politics model, and the adjusted count R2 figures indicate that the rule-of-law model
contributes 12 percent more accuracy beyond simply predicting the more frequent outcome than
50

However, the Political variable is statistically significant and has the anticipated negative sign when it is used
instead of Federal Statute with Territoriality (Contacts) in the full model (Model 4). I take this as an indication that
the salience hypothesis merits further testing.
51
I used the Clarify software program (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001) to simulate a change in the expected
value of the dependent variable caused by increasing each independent variable from 0 to 1 (in the case of dummy
variables) and from the 25th to the 75th percentile (in the case of continuous variables), setting each of the other
variables at their mode (for dummy variables) or mean (for continuous variables), and based on Model 3.
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the politics model contributes. The area under the ROC curves for the two models suggest that
the rule-of-law model may be slightly more discriminating, and the results also provide very
strong evidence that the rule-of-law model is preferable according to the Bayesian information
criterion. Although the measures of fit presented in Table 4 provide only rules of thumb for
comparing statistical models, they all suggest that rule-of-law factors may be playing a more
important role than political factors in the choice between domestic and foreign adjudicative
authority.
Table 4. Comparing the Politics and Rule of Law Models
Model 2
Rule of Law
.712

Difference

Correctly Classified

Model 1
Politics
.655

Adjusted Count R2

.283

.402

.120

Area under ROC Curve

.743

.757

.014

-739.960

-767.119

-27.159

Bayesian Information
Criterion

.057

Notes: The correctly classified figure indicates the proportion of outcomes that were correctly classified by the
model using a .5 probability cutoff to translate predicted probabilities into dichotomous predictions (Hamilton 2004,
270-271). Thus, it indicates the proportion of outcomes for which the model estimated at least a .5 probability of
deference to foreign governance authority, and the court in fact defers. Adjusted count R2 is the proportion of
correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly predicted simply by choosing the outcome with the
largest percentage of observed cases, using a .5 probability cutoff (Long and Freese 2006, 111-112). The ROC
curve plots 1 minus the specificity (the false positive rate) on the x-axis and sensitivity (the true positive rate) on the
y-axis for each possible probability cutoff. The area under the ROC curve is equal to the probability that a random
decision granting a forum non conveniens motion has a higher value of the dependent variable than a random
decision denying a forum non conveniens motion (Altman and Bland 1994, 188). The larger the area under the
curve, the more discriminating the model. The BIC is the Bayesian information criterion. The more negative the
BIC, the better the fit, and the greater the absolute difference between the BIC of two models, the stronger the
evidence that one is to be preferred over the other. As a rule of thumb, an absolute difference of 0-2 is considered
weak, 2-6 positive, 6-10 strong, and greater than 10 very strong evidence (Long and Freese 2006, 112-113).

5.2

Law or Heuristics? A Qualitative Analysis

My logit analysis provides evidence indicating that both the pro-domestic plaintiff bias of
the forum non conveniens doctrine and the territoriality heuristic influence the choice between
domestic and foreign adjudicative authority. But is law or heuristics more important in forum
non conveniens decisionmaking? I have argued that because U.S. district court judges face a
combination of high decisionmaking demands and limited decisionmaking resources, the
heuristics model is more convincing theoretically. Empirically, however, the logit analysis does
not clearly indicate whether the heuristics model or the legal model describes the more important
causal mechanism. As discussed above, a change from “no” to “yes” in the Territoriality (Place)
variable has a substantively larger impact on the probability of dismissal (42 percent) than the
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same change in the Domestic Plaintiff variable (-21 percent). In addition, the Territoriality
(Place) variable alone more accurately classifies outcomes than that the Domestic Plaintiff
variable alone. 52 These quantitative indictors suggest that heuristics may play a more important
role than legal doctrine in the choice between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority.
However, as Baum (1994, 762) points out, in judicial decisionmaking “a particular
pattern of behavior usually is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” This
problem cannot be taken lightly in the study of judicial heuristics. For a particular heuristic to be
a plausible explanation for judicial decisionmaking, it must tend not to result in decisions that
clearly are legally erroneous, which means that it must have some relationship to doctrinallyspecified decisionmaking factors. But this creates a risk that a pattern of decisionmaking that
appears driven by such a heuristic may in fact partly reflect legal analysis of those factors rather
than the use of decisionmaking shortcuts. To mitigate this risk and to discriminate more
effectively between law and heuristics, I conducted a qualitative analysis of each of the 210
judicial opinions in my dataset using the method of structured, focused comparison (George and
Bennett 2005, chap. 3). The comparison focuses on the judge’s legal analysis of the forum non
conveniens issue as set forth in the opinion, with the goal of evaluating the extent to which the
judge actually analyzed the factors specified in the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement of the forum
non conveniens doctrine. An observable implication of the legal model is that most of these
factors will be analyzed, whereas an observable implication of the heuristics model is that at least
some of them will not. 53 To structure the comparison, I divided the forum non conveniens
doctrine, as set forth in by the Supreme Court in Gilbert v. Gulf Oil and Piper v. Reyno, into
eleven distinct elements (see the table in Appendix B), and systematically applied them by
giving each case one point for each element of doctrine analyzed in the opinion. 54
Table 5 below presents the results of the qualitative analysis. Overall, U.S. district court
judges include in their opinions an average of only five of eleven elements of forum non
conveniens analysis. This represents an estimated average of 48 percent of the elements, with a
95 percent level of confidence that the actual average is between 44 and 52 percent. The result is
consistent across the four main parts of the forum non conveniens doctrine, with only 47 percent
of cases addressing the level of deference owed to the plaintiff’s choice of forum based on the
plaintiff’s citizenship, and only 55 percent including an analysis of the proposed alternative
forum. 55 Similarly, judges analyzed an average of only 2.15 private interest elements out of four
and only 2.11 public interest elements out of five. This evidence is what the heuristics model
would predict, but it is difficult to reconcile with the legal model. Therefore, although the logit
52

The principal measures of fit all favor Territoriality (Place) over Domestic Plaintiff (proportion correctly
classified .698 versus .668; adjusted count R2 of .347 versus .284, area under ROC curve of .700 versus .669, and
BIC of -831.280 versus -821.143), with observations with missing data dropped to ensure that the tests are run on
the same samples.
53
As Segal (1984, 894) and Spaeth (1995, 296) note, the presence of analysis in a judicial opinion does not
necessarily mean that it was an a priori basis for the judge’s decision rather than a post hoc justification for it. Thus,
there is some risk that my method overestimates the impact of legal analysis.
54
Legal analysis is the application of applicable legal principles to the facts in order to generate a legal conclusion.
Therefore, I gave points for combined statements of law and fact, but not for mere recitation of legal principles or
summary legal conclusions not explicitly based on some fact.
55
Note that in some cases the judge may omit analysis of the alternative forum because the plaintiff does not
challenge its availability and adequacy.
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analysis above suggests that at least one legal factor—whether the plaintiff is domestic—has an
important influence on forum non conveniens decisionmaking, I tentatively conclude that the
heuristics model more accurately describes the causal mechanism that underlies the choice
between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority. This form of transnational judicial
governance indeed appears largely based on the rule of law—not the “law maximizing” idealtype rule of law implied by the legal model, but rather the “law satisficing” rule of law implied
by the heuristics model.
Table 5. Elements of Forum Non Conveniens Analysis Included in Judges’ Opinions
Elements of Forum Non
Conveniens Analysis
Level of Deference

Points
Possible
1

Mean

Std. Error

.467

.034

95% Confidence
Interval
[.400, .534]

Alternative Forum

1

.552

.034

[.485, .618]

Private Interest Factors

4

2.152

.081

[1.993, 2.311]

Public Interest Factors

5

2.110

.108

[1.900, 2.323]

Total

11

5.281

.206

[4.875, 5.687]

5.3

Threats to Causal Inferences: Judicial Fact Discretion and Selection Bias

Like all research designs, mine involves tradeoffs that may pose threats to the causal
inferences I have made. First, my measures of territoriality are based on statements contained in
court opinions. The potential problem is that to the extent judges selectively report the facts of a
case as part of a post hoc legal rationalization of their decisions, these statements may not be
reliable (George and Epstein 1992, 328; Spaeth 1995, 296). If judges include a disproportionate
number of facts indicating domestic connections when they decide to assert domestic
adjudicative authority (and vice versa), then such selectivity might create bias, exaggerating the
effect of the territoriality heuristic. For two reasons, however, my assessment is that this does
not seriously threaten my analysis. First, one would expect judges who engage in selective fact
reporting as a method of post hoc legal rationalization to selectively state facts that are legally
relevant according to the applicable legal doctrine—in this case, facts that are directly relevant to
the factors specified by the forum non conveniens doctrine, such as those listed in Appendix B.
However, the locus of the transnational activity giving rise to the dispute is not one of those
factors. Moreover, my measure of territoriality excludes statements about the location of
witnesses and other sources of evidence, which could be used to rationalize decisions since ease
of access to witnesses and documents are among the private interest factors specified by the
forum non conveniens doctrine. 56
56

By itself, however, this is only a partial solution because it does not eliminate the risk posed by selective
statements of facts about territoriality to justify decisions under the “local interest in localized controversies” factor
of forum non conveniens analysis.
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Second, a comparison of two different measures of territorial statements in court
opinions—one quantitative measure designed to capture selectivity and another qualitative
measure designed to be less sensitive to selectivity—have very similar values for decisions to
grant forum non conveniens motions and decisions to deny them. The first measure is a
percentage equal to the raw number of statements in the court’s opinion locating an act or thing
giving rise to the litigation outside U.S. territory, divided by the total number of statements
locating such an act or thing either inside or outside U.S. territory. This quantitative measure is
deliberately sensitive to court opinions that overstate extraterritorial contacts relative to domestic
contacts (or vice versa). The second measure is a percentage representing the extent to which the
two conceptual elements of the activity giving rise to the litigation are outside U.S. territory: the
place of the plaintiff’s injury and the place of the defendant’s alleged conduct. I coded each
element as purely domestic (0), mixed (1), or purely foreign (2), regardless of the total number of
related statements about domestic or foreign location, such that their sum can range from 0 out of
4 (0 percent) to 4 out of 4 (100 percent). By disregarding the quantity of territorial statements,
this qualitative measure should be less sensitive to factual selectivity. 57 Thus, to the extent
judges are creating post hoc justifications for their decisions by selectively stating facts about
territoriality in their opinions, the first measure should be higher than the second for decisions to
grant forum non conveniens motions (indicating overstatements of foreign contacts), and lower
than the second for decisions to deny them (indicating understatements of foreign contacts).
Table 6. Selectivity in Statements of Territorial Facts in Forum Non Conveniens Opinions

Forum Non
Conveniens
Decision

Assert Domestic
Adjudicative
Authority

Measures of Territoriality
Quantitative
Qualitative
Paired t-test
Measure
Measure
(P>|t|)
.538
.532
.772

Defer to Foreign
Adjudicative
Authority

.711

.734

.284

Total

.619

.626

.624

Table 6 indicates that this is not the case. When U.S. district courts assert domestic
adjudicative authority, the quantitative measure is slightly higher on average; and when they
defer to foreign adjudicative authority the qualitative measure is slightly higher on average.
However, as the t-tests indicate, neither difference is statistically significant. Therefore, my

57

Even if the qualitative measure reduces sensitivity to selective statements of facts, it would still be sensitive to
judicial mischaracterization of facts. However, it is reasonable to assume that mischaracterization is uncommon
(Hall and Wright 2006, 18). Moreover, even if there is occasional mischaracterization, judges presumably are more
willing to be selective than to mischaracterize, which means the quantitative measure should nevertheless be more
sensitive than the qualitative measure to efforts to use statements of facts for post hoc rationalization.

Whytock 28
assessment is that the possibility of selective statements of territorial facts does not pose a
serious threat to my inferences about the influence of the territoriality heuristic.
A second potential threat to my causal inferences arises because my sample includes only
decisions that have been published either in the U.S. district courts’ official reporter, the Federal
Supplement, or electronically in the LexisNexis database. If published forum non conveniens
decisions are not representative of the overall population of forum non conveniens decisions,
then selection bias may limit the generalizability of my causal inferences to that population. As
discussed above, however, the most important decisions for global governance are precisely
published decisions, because only they not only affect the litigants in individual cases but also
provide information that can more broadly influence the strategic behavior of transnational
actors. 58 Therefore, in the study of transnational judicial governance, the possibility of selection
bias caused by differences between published and unpublished decisions is not a central problem
because it is not essential to generalize beyond published decisions in the first place. 59
That said, it is not clear that this form of selection bias is a threat even to causal
inferences about the overall population of forum non conveniens decisions. Even if my sample
is not representative of the overall population, selection bias, understood as an omitted variable
problem (Heckman 1979, 154-155), will threaten my causal inferences only if a determinant of
publication has a causal effect on forum non conveniens decisionmaking and is correlated with
one or more of my included independent variables (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 169).
Assessing the threat of selection bias therefore requires an understanding of how U.S. district
court judges decide whether or not to publish. Although the determinants of the publication
decision are not well understood, there is some evidence that U.S. district court judges are less
likely to publish decisions in which the federal government is a party, and that they are more
likely to publish cases establishing a new rule of law or in which large companies or law firms
are involved, or if they are in the first or second federal judicial circuits (Swenson 2004, 131136). Moreover, one would expect judges to be less likely to publish when they have heavier
caseloads (Vladeck and Gulati 2005, 1-5) and more likely to publish decisions that they find
more salient (Olson 1992, 796-797). There are not obvious reasons to expect most of these
possible determinants of publication to have a causal effect on forum non conveniens

58

Moreover, only published decisions are likely to be used as binding legal precedent—as a practical matter,
because attorneys cannot readily research unpublished decisions, and sometimes as a legal matter, when court rules
prohibit citation to opinions that are designated as “unpublished” (Gerken 2004). Olson (1992, 795) notes that
despite the limitations of reliance on only published decisions, such an approach “may be most justifiable for a
researcher who is trying to study efficiently the ‘public policy’ output of district courts.”
59
Likewise, case-selection effects do not pose a threat to causal inferences about forum non conveniens
decisionmaking. The case-selection effect “refers to the proposition that the parties’ selection of litigated or tried
cases is not a random sample of the mass of underlying disputes or cases, but instead a biased sample” (Clermont
and Eisenberg 1998, 588). Therefore, “win rates reveal something about the set of adjudged cases, and not much
about the underlying mass of disputes and cases” (Clermont and Eisenberg 1998, 589). However, this study aims to
explain the determinants of forum non conveniens decisionmaking, not to shed light on “the underlying mass of
disputes and cases,” as important as this is. Although the case-selection effect must be understood to attribute legal
meaning to forum non conveniens motion “win rates” (that is, grants of forum non conveniens motions), this is not
necessary to make causal inferences about my primary (published forum non conveniens decisions by U.S. district
courts) or secondary (all forum non conveniens decisions, whether or not published) populations of interest.
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decisionmaking. 60 However, as discussed above, there are reasons to expect salience to have a
negative effect and caseload to have a positive effect on the probability of granting forum non
conveniens motions, and these factors also are likely to be highly correlated with the independent
variables I include in my model to measure salience and caseload. The possibility of selection
bias means that salience and caseload may actually have an effect in the general population of
forum non conveniens decisions even though they do not have a statistically significant effect in
my sample of published forum non conveniens cases, although the extent of any such bias is
difficult to estimate. 61 In summary, although the possibility of selection bias resulting from
skewed publication patterns must be taken seriously (Clermont and Eisenberg 2002, 125-126),
my preliminary assessment is that my causal inferences about published forum non conveniens
decisions might nevertheless be soundly generalizable to the overall population of forum non
conveniens decisions. 62

6.

Conclusion

Political scientists and legal scholars have long recognized the important role that
domestic courts play in domestic governance, in both the United States and other states (Dahl
1957; Hirschl 2004, 2006; Shapiro 1962, 1981; Stone Sweet 2000; Tate and Vallinder 1995).
More recently, international courts are receiving greater scholarly attention for their role in both
60

For example, any effect of federal government, large company, or large law firm involvement would likely
depend on whether such a party prefers that the forum non conveniens motion be granted or denied, and the
establishment of a new rule of law would not seem to be systematically more or less likely in connection with grants
rather than denials of forum non conveniens motions. Likewise, there is no apparent reason to expect membership
in the first or seventh circuit to make a U.S. district court judge more or less likely to grant these motions. Other
than possible correlations between federal government involvement and my measure of salience (whether there is an
issue of federal law) and circuit and caseload, there is no apparent reason to expect these factors to be significantly
correlated with independent variables that are included in my model.
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Existing research suggests that ideology does not influence publication by the federal courts of appeals (Merritt
and Brudney 2001, 98). Consistent with these priors, Swenson (2004, 132) finds that the interaction between the
ideological direction of the decision and the judge’s party has no effect on publication. However, one of the
constitutive terms of this interaction, the ideological direction of the decision, does have a statistically significant
effect in her model, indicating that conservative decisions are less likely to be published (2004, 132). This finding
raises the possibility that my sample may under-represent denials of forum non conveniens motions (assuming
judges in fact perceive denials as intrinsically more conservative than grants), and that selection bias may limit my
ability to generalize my findings about potentially correlated variables (including judges’ ideologies and the political
environment) to the overall population of forum non conveniens decisions. However, Swenson omits the other
constitutive term, the judge’s party, from her statistical model (2004, 132). The almost inevitable result is that her
estimates of the coefficients for the ideological direction of the decision and for the interaction term are biased and
inconsistent (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005, 67). Moreover, the coefficient for a constitutive term only captures
the impact it has on the dependent variable when the other constitutive variable equals 0 (and vice versa)
(Braumoeller 2004, 809). By omitting the judge’s party constitutive term, she in effect forces it to 0 (Braumoeller
2004, 813), but since we do not know whether 0 indicates Democrat or Republican, we do not know whether her
finding about the ideological direction of the decision, if valid at all, is capturing its effect on publication when
judges are Democrat or when they are Republican. Therefore, although the possibility of selection bias caused by
the relationship between the ideological direction of decisions and the decision to publish cannot be eliminated,
there does not appear to be sound empirical evidence suggesting that such bias is likely.
62
In contrast to my causal inferences, however, to attribute legal meaning to my descriptive statistics about the
forum non conveniens decisions in my sample, it is absolutely essential to understand the selection process
(Clermont and Eisenberg 2002, 137-14). For example, as discussed above, what would seem to be a surprisingly
high rate of forum non conveniens dismissals may simply be due to many cases being brought in U.S. district courts
by foreign plaintiffs in disputes arising from primarily extraterritorial activity.
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international and domestic governance (Alter 2001, 2006; Caporaso and Jupille 2005; Cichowski
2006; Conant 2006; Helfer and Slaughter 1997; Volcansek and Stack 2005). This paper, and the
broader project of which it is a part, complements this work by focusing on a largely neglected
form of judicial governance: the role of domestic courts in global governance.
But this paper also has broader implications for the study of international relations. Most
importantly, it suggests that for scholars of international political economy and global
governance to have a satisfactory understanding of how states regulate transnational activity,
they cannot ignore domestic institutions, including domestic courts. It reinforces the earlier calls
of Shapiro (1993, 267) and Slaughter (1993, 231) for international relations scholars to develop a
better understanding of private international law, which is the doctrinal counterpart to
transnational judicial governance. The paper also has broader implications for the study of
judicial decisionmaking. My findings provide empirical support for Slaughter’s liberal
international law theory: U.S. district court judges indeed appear more likely to defer to the
adjudicative authority of other liberal democracies than to the adjudicative authority of other
states. My findings also reinforce claims that while the attitudinal and strategic models of
judicial decisionmaking do a good job explaining Supreme Court decisions, they may not be as
effective when applied to the decisions of lower court judges. At the same time, however, my
findings suggest that the legal model may overestimate the ability of busy lower court judges to
engage in systematic legal analysis. Although one must generalize with caution, the heuristics
model developed in this paper may better describe the decisionmaking process in U.S. district
courts than the attitudinal, strategic, and legal models.
I have found that rule-of-law factors appear to predominate in transnational judicial
governance, at least in the allocation of adjudicative authority in forum non conveniens
decisionmaking. In this sense, my conclusions are optimistic about the possibility of a
distinctive role for domestic courts in global governance. However, as indicated by the
heuristics model of judicial decisionmaking developed in this paper, my conclusions are also
realistic in the sense that they explicitly take into account the limited decisionmaking resources
of judges. If transnational judicial governance is based on the rule of law, it is not an ideal-type
“law maximizing” rule of law, but a more modest “law satisficing” rule of law. And to the
extent my heuristics model is convincing, then barring some combination of increased judicial
resources, reduced caseload, or substantial reform of private international law principles to make
them far more simple for judges to apply, this modest version of the rule of law is probably all
that we can reasonably expect.

Whytock 31

Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Variable

Obs.

Mean

Deference to Foreign Governance Authority
Republican Judge
Republican Environment
Domestic Plaintiff
Domestic Defendant
Foreign State’s GDP (log)
Foreign State’s Military Spending (log)
Liberal Democracy
Territoriality (Place)
Territoriality (Contacts)
Federal Statute
Political
Caseload (log)

210
208
210
207
207
200
189
203
206
208
209
209
208

.471
.548
.381
.512
.469
12.634
17.987
.769
.524
.619
.330
.091
6.131

Std.
Dev.
.500
.499
.487
.501
.500
1.799
1.676
.423
.501
.228
.471
.288
.254

Min.

Max.

0
0
0
0
0
5.780
12.635
0
0
0
0
0
5.323

1
1
1
1
1
15.373
19.937
1
1
1
1
1
6.788

Whytock 32

Appendix B: Overview of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine
In Piper v. Reyno (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court summarized the forum non conveniens
doctrine as follows:
[W]hen an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in the chosen forum would
‘establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s
convenience,’ or when the ‘chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s
own administrative and legal problems,’ the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the
case. To guide trial court discretion, the Court provided a list of ‘private interest factors’ affecting the
63
convenience of the litigants, and a list of ‘public interest factors’ affecting the convenience of the forum.

The following is the list of factors to be considered by district courts when deciding
whether to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds, excerpted from the Supreme
Court’s seminal statement of the forum non conveniens doctrine in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert (1947):
If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to
be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed,
is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance
of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be
questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages
and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own
right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for
courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a
burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.
In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and
reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than
64
having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.

Subsequently, in Piper v. Reyno (1981), the Supreme Court stated that “a plaintiff’s
choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum.
When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient.
When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. Because the
central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a
foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.” 65 It also clarified that “[a]t the outset of any
forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative
forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is ‘amenable to process’
in the other jurisdiction. In rare circumstances, however, where the remedy offered by the other
forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the
63

454 U.S. 235, 241 (citations omitted).
330 U.S. 501, 508-509 (footnotes omitted).
65
454 U.S. 235, 266.
64
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initial requirement may not be satisfied. Thus, for example, dismissal would not be appropriate
where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.” 66
The forum non conveniens doctrine thus calls on district courts to make three principal
determinations: the level of deference owed to the plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. court, the existence
of an alternative forum, and the balancing of private and public interest factors. The doctrine
explicitly identifies a specific fact that should be the basis for making the first determination: the
citizenship of the plaintiff. A district court should give more deference to a U.S. plaintiff’s
choice of a U.S. court than a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. court. The legal model of
judicial decisionmaking would therefore imply the following hypothesis: A district court judge is
more likely to grant a motion to dismiss transnational litigation in favor of a foreign court on
forum non conveniens grounds if the plaintiff is a foreign citizen rather than a U.S. citizen.
The two other parts of forum non conveniens doctrine do not provide a sound basis for
building a legal model of forum non conveniens decisionmaking or generating additional legal
model hypotheses. Regarding the second element, the doctrine does not explicitly identify
specific facts that should be the basis for determining whether there is an alternative forum.
Rather, it raises two subsidiary legal issues: whether the defendant would be subject to the
foreign court’s jurisdiction (availability) and whether an adequate remedy for the plaintiff is
available in the foreign court (adequacy). Segal (1984) addressed similar subsidiary legal issues
in his legal model of Supreme Court search and seizure decisionmaking by measuring how the
lower court judges in each case resolved these issues. He did not use the Supreme Court’s own
case-by-case decisions on these issues, such as probable cause, because “we do not know
whether the Court’s decision on probable cause contributes to its decision . . . or merely justifies
that decision” (Segal 1984, 894). Unfortunately, this solution is not available for studies of
district court forum non conveniens decisionmaking because there are no relevant lower courts.
The third element—the balancing of private and public interest factors—is likewise
problematic. The “availability of compulsory process,” the “enforcibility of the judgment,” and
the “law that must govern the case” all raise subsidiary legal issues, raising the same difficulty as
the second element. Other factors—“relative ease of access to sources of proof,” “view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action,” “all other practical problems,”
“administrative difficulties . . . when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being
handled at its origin,” the community’s “relation to the litigation” and whether the controversy is
“localized”—do not explicitly identify the specific facts to be considered when weighing each of
them. 67 While some such facts may suggest themselves to district court judges as a matter of
common sense or emerge as useful decisionmaking heuristics, measuring them as variables to
test a legal model of forum non conveniens is not appropriate because they are not identified by
the doctrine itself. In other words, variables for facts that are not explicitly identified in the legal
doctrine but nevertheless included because they are deemed relevant by the model-builder would
measure the model-builder’s interpretation of the doctrine rather than Supreme Court’s statement
of the doctrine itself.
66

454 U.S. 235, 255 (citations omitted).
The remaining factor—“the cost of obtaining attendance of . . . witnesses” and—does suggest a doctrinally
relevant fact. However, this cost is virtually never calculated in district court opinions. Instead, this factor typically
is analyzed by considering where the witnesses reside relative to the court.
67
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Although the forum non conveniens doctrine does not lend itself to the development of a
comprehensive legal model for predicting the outcomes of forum non conveniens decisions, it
does provide the basis for the qualitative analysis of judicial opinions using the method of
structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005, chap. 3) to evaluate the extent to
which these decisions are based on legal analysis, as the legal model would imply. To structure
this comparison, I divided the forum non conveniens doctrine, as set forth in by the Supreme
Court in Gilbert v. Gulf Oil and Piper v. Reyno, into the following eleven elements and applied
them as described in the body of this paper:
Elements of Forum Non Conveniens Analysis
Level of Deference

1

Determination of the level of deference owed to the plaintiff’s
choice of a U.S. court, based on whether the plaintiff is a U.S.
citizen.
Whether the proposed foreign court an available and adequate
alternative.

Alternative Forum

2

Private Interest Factors

3
4
5
6

Relative ease of access to sources of proof.
Relative ease of access to witnesses.
The enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained.
Whether the balance of private interest factors favors the
defendant.

Public Interest Factors

7
8
9
10
11

Extent of administrative difficulties from court congestion.
Burden of jury duty imposed on people of the community.
Local interest in localized controversies.
Whether the court is at home with the governing law.
Whether the balance of public interest factors favors the
foreign court.

Note: I did not count for view of the premises or “other” private interest factors, because these will not always be
factually relevant, which means checking for them as part of the qualitative analysis would have risked creating bias
against the legal model. The factors that are included in this analysis are relevant regardless of the specific facts of
the case and therefore should, in principle, be analyzed in all cases.
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